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Summary 
 
In many contexts, the Nordic countries are regarded as a natural bloc of nations that have 
common political, cultural and economic characteristics. Open to globalisation, the small 
Nordic countries are exposed to strong global competition and cyclical influences. Therefore, 
the basis of the model may be to combine collective risk sharing and openness to 
globalisation. Studies of the Nordic model do not focus on the question whether the monetary 
policy regime is a constitutive element of the model. While the core elements of the model 
have proved to be quite robust and stable, the monetary regimes were exposed to 
fundamental changes and are quite different today.  
According to the “incompatible trinity” (Mundell 1968), a country can only choose two of the 
three following goals: independent monetary policy, fixed exchange rates and free capital 
movements. As EU-member states, Finland adopted the Euro and Denmark became a 
member of the ERMII, pegging the Danish Crown to the Euro at a fixed rate. Contrary to a 
fixed exchange rate regime, the third Nordic EU-member Sweden, as like as the non-EU-
member Norway, introduced flexible exchange rates combined with inflation targeting. 
In his study, I explore the question whether and how the monetary policy regimes are 
significant to the success of the Nordic Model given the fact that monetary policies in the 
Nordics were designed quite differently during the past fifteen years. 
In some way, all four Nordic countries have been conducting a monetary policy regime of 
flexible inflation targeting since the 1990s (Norway as late as from 2001). In a way, all four 
Nordics have limited power to conduct an independent monetary policy. In order to keep the 
own country’s international competitiveness, they have to get help from the parties in the 
labour marked to adapt wage setting compatible to the external inflation target. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Nordic Countries include Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Island. In this paper 
we will deal with the first four countries1. In many contexts, the Nordic countries are 
regarded as a natural bloc of nations having common political, cultural and economic 
characteristics. 
The countries represent a kind of ‘societal model’, a ‘social and economic system’, 
characterized by the term ‘Nordic model’ (Moene 2011; Andersen et al. 2007).2 The Nordic 
model reveals continuity and robustness over time. It is characterised by a high level of wage 
equality, centralised wage negotiations, high workers security and a generous, universalist 
welfare state. The Nordic model rests on specific institutional arrangements and social 
norms. As small open economies, the Nordic countries are exposed to strong global 
competition, growth-enhancing technical change and cyclical influences. In this respect one 
can say that “… the basis of the model is a combination of collective risk sharing and 
openness to globalization ... collective risk sharing helps make globalization acceptable to 
citizens, by facilitating adjustments that allow the economy to benefit from changing markets 
and to raise productivity and incomes” (Andersen et al. 2007:14). The ‘perception of 
vulnerability’ as the price for openness to globalisation, but also as a driving force to growth 
and prosperity, is characteristic for the Nordic countries as well as for some other European 
small states (Katzenstein 2003).  
Because of their openness, macroeconomic policy has to be coordinated with wage setting 
and labour market policies in order to promote international competitiveness as well as 
macroeconomic stability and high employment. There are, however, few studies that have 
focused on the question whether the monetary policy regime (including the exchange rate 
regime) is a constitutive element of the Nordic model.  While the core elements of the model 
have proved to be quite robust and stable in the long run, the monetary regimes in the Nordic 
countries have been exposed to fundamental changes due to the process of on-going 
globalization. Even more, three Nordic countries joined the European Union3, thereby 
                                                          
1 Island as the smallest country with about 1,2 % of the Nordics’ population has a very specialized 
sectoral structure with fishing and fish products as main industry (about 40 % of the country’s total 
exports). Recently, Island suffered from a severe financial and economic crisis mainly related to policy 
failures at home (Sighvatsson 2012; Guðmundsson 2012). 
2 “But, as we have seen in the Nordic countries, tremendous accomplishments with respect to income 
distribution can be achieved with taxation and ‘wage solidarity’. One might say that the future of 
socialism lies in emulating the Nordic social democracies. They may, however, not be easy to emulate, 
as the solidarity of their citizenries may be due to their homogeneity – linguistic, religious, and ethnic. 
Perhaps welfare states of that magnitude cannot be achieved in highly heterogeneous societies.” 
(Roemer 2008). Sometimes, the synonymous term «Scandinavian model» is used. 
3 Denmark in 1973, Sweden and Finland in 1995. At the same time, Norway and Island together with 
Liechtenstein signet the association agreement “European Economic Area” (EEA). It allows to 
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accepting supranational, common restrictions on national budget policy autonomy. Finland 
became a member of the European ‘Economic and Monetary Union’ (EMU) in 1999, 
exchanging its national currency and monetary policy autonomy for a common currency and 
an independent, supranational monetary policy. Denmark, yet not a member of the 
Eurozone, is part of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) since 1999.4 
In light of the fact that the Nordics have quite different monetary policy arrangements, the 
aim of this paper is to study whether at all, and to what extent the choice of a particular 
monetary policy regime in a small open economy is decisive in reaching the fundamental 
goals of a modern welfare economy like the Nordics.  
As other empirical studies indicate, the choice of a particular monetary policy regime in itself 
may not be decisive for the economic performance of a country. It appears to be more 
important how effective the monetary policy is conducted and whether or not it is 
coordinated with fiscal stabilization policies and wage setting in the labour market.  
Even when the role of monetary policy “in explaining the relative performance of the Nordics 
is limited since stability-oriented monetary policies have become increasingly widespread” 
(Liikanen 2007), the coordination of monetary, fiscal and wage policies may have a positive 
impact as compared to non-coordinated policies. 
2. Monetary policy regimes 
 
After the Second World War and the end of the Bretton Woods Agreement,  a variety of 
different monetary policy regimes have been tried out around the world. In the 1970s and 
1980s money supply targeting, theoretically founded by Milton Friedman’s monetarism, 
became popular in countries like Germany and the USA (Benati and Goodhart, 2011). Other 
countries, including the small Nordic countries, focused on exchange-rate targeting 
(Straumann 2010). From the 1990s, (flexible) inflation targeting became popular, both in the 
North and in the world’s biggest currency union, the EU (Laidler 2005; Straumann 2010).  
Today, more than 25 countries use an inflation targeting regime. The first country was New 
Zealand 1989. Sweden followed in 1993 and Norway officially changed from exchange rate to 
flexible inflation targeting in 2001 (Svensson 2011; Ball 2011; Gjedrem 2004; Hagelund 
2003). Other countries joined a monetary union (as Finland did). Denmark retained its own 
currency, pegged to the Euro. From a European perspective we can say that from the 1990s 
                                                          
participate in the EU’s internal marked, obliged to adopt all EU legislation related to the single market, 
except laws on agriculture and fisheries (http://eeas.europa.eu/eea/, accessed 10 Dec 2012).  
4 In the ERM II, the Danish National Bank is keeping the exchange rate of the Danish Crown within 
the narrower range of ± 2.25% against the central rate of EUR 1 = DKK 7.460 38 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/erm2/, accessed 10 Dec 2012).  
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“Western European countries either completely abandoned their monetary independence by 
adopting the Euro, or they shifted to a floating regime (Straumann 2010:4). 
Inflation targeting as a monetary-policy strategy “is characterized by (1) an announced 
numerical inflation target, (2) an implementation of monetary policy that gives a major role 
to an inflation forecast …and (3) a high degree of transparency and accountability. Inflation 
targeting is highly associated with an institutional framework characterized by the trinity of 
(1) a mandate for price stability, (2) independence, and (3) accountability for the central 
bank” (Svensson 2011).5 
The attribute “flexible” specifies that the target variables of the central bank not only include 
the announced numerical inflation rate but also other variables such as the output gap 
and/or the unemployment rate. In other words, the central bank not only has to stabilise 
inflation around its long run target rate, it also has to consider short-run cyclical imbalances 
in the real economy in order to stabilise production and employment around a long-term 
sustainable trend.  
In recent years, inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule has been called into question , 
mainly due to “its oversight of asset bubbles and supply side shocks” (Frankel 2012a) and the 
lack of control of the financial sector (Laidler 2005; Arestis 2012). Nominal GDP targeting 
instead of inflation targeting is now launched as a nominal anchor of a rule based economic 
policy (Frankel 2012a; 2012b). The current period of global financial crisis (and in particular 
the “Euro-crisis” in Europe) is accompanied by historical low inflation and interest rates, 
stagnation and growing unemployment. In this macroeconomic setting, inflation targeting 
alone runs the risk of being ineffective. The ECB and the US Federal Reserve have recently 
conducted expansionary, “old fashioned”, money supply policy beyond a straight rule based 
inflation targeting. But this topic is not further discussed here. 
The Nordic model has traditionally been based on a co-ordinated interaction of centralised 
and solidaristic wage bargaining, accommodating flexible monetary policy, and a 
redistributive and labour-intensive public welfare state. Growing global competition and 
integration of capital markets have, however, led to fundamental change in the 
macroeconomic policy regime from accommodating to nonaccommodating monetary policies 
combined with more wage flexibility and more inequality (Iversen 2000). 
According to Iversen, there are the “interactions of three macroinstitutions that jointly shape 
economic behavior and outcomes: the collective bargaining system, the macroeconomic 
policy regime, and the welfare” (Iversen 2000:206). 
                                                          
5 The literature of the last 25 years on inflation targeting is enormous. See eg. Svensson (2011) for a 
review of some of this literature. According to the distinction between ‘rules versus discretion’ in 
monetary policies, inflation targeting is genuinely a rule based monetary policy regime (eg. Alesina & 
Stella 2011; Taylor 1993). 
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There seems to be an agreement in the literature that countries with large encompassing 
unions and a high degree of co-ordination in the wage setting generally have lower 
unemployment. Centralised wage bargaining and low unemployment is also a core element of 
the Nordic model. However, as Holden (2005) points out, the monetary regime may 
influence whether co-ordination is sustainable. When wage setting is uncoordinated, a strict, 
non-accommodating monetary policy may discipline wage setters, but at the same time 
reducing wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate. On the other side, an accommodating 
monetary policy may strengthen the wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate, and thus reduce 
equilibrium unemployment. 
In a monetary union (i.e. Eurozone), the disciplining effect of non-accommodating monetary 
policy will be lower in a single member state than under a strict national monetary policy 
regime. But at the same time, incentives for voluntary co-ordinated wage setting at the 
national level are higher, resulting in lower equilibrium unemployment.6 
This will mean that co-ordinated wage setting both in the small Euro-member Finland and 
the small ERMII-member Denmark may have a positive effect on unemployment. On the 
other side, monetary policy in Sweden and Norway, based on a rule of inflation-targeting, 
may be classified as non-accommodating. Here, we may expect according to Holden, that 
wage setting after introducing inflation targeting, has become less co-ordinated – and 
therefore contributed to higher equilibrium unemployment.7 If wage setting in Norway and 
Sweden is still co-ordinated today, this may indicate that even the monetary policy regime 
can be classified as accommodating, due to a relative strong (flexible!) accommodation to 
unemployment compared to the numerical inflation target,  
If co-ordinated wage setting in Finland and Denmark result in lower wage increases and 
lower inflation than in other Euro-member countries, the result over time would be 
increasing competitiveness due to the real depreciation effect, with positive effects on 
employment. 
  
                                                          
6 As Holden (2005) comments: “In a country where co-ordinated wage restraint is at work, 
membership in a monetary union would reduce equilibrium unemployment as compared to having a 
strict monetary regime, but increase equilibrium unemployment compared to having an 
accommodating monetary regime. However, in countries with large wage setters, but where co-
ordination of wage setting nevertheless does not work, the general results of Bratsiotis and Martin 
(1999) and Soskice and Iversen (2000) hold, and a stricter monetary regime involves lower 
equilibrium unemployment.” (Holden 2005:841) 
7 The penalty for deviating from co-ordinated wage setting in this case is smaller. 
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3. The link between monetary policy and exchange 
rate regime  
 
Monetary policy regimes and their effects have been a popular subject for economic research 
(Ball 2010; Benati & Goodhart 2011; Klein and Shambaugh 2010; Christensen & Lynggård 
2007). At any time, different countries have chosen different regimes, and over time, 
countries have changed their monetary policy regimes. In particular for small open 
economies, the choice of the monetary policy and the exchange rate regime are two sides of 
the same coin. The question about the reasons and the consequences of a country’s choice of 
monetary and exchange rate system is a complex subject. Straumann specifies the “problem 
of double difference” when asking for what factors determine the choice of exchange rate 
(and monetary) regimes in the small and advanced European countries: “… small European 
states differed not only with respect to their domestic institutions and policy preferences but 
also with respect to their external political and economic structures” (Straumann 2010:16) 
Rose (2011) is even more humble when he says that it is quite difficult to compare countries 
across exchange rate regimes empirically. “It is often hard to figure out what the exchange 
rate regime of a country is in practice, since there are multiple conflicting regime 
classifications. More importantly, similar countries choose radically different exchange rate 
regimes without substantive consequences for macroeconomic outcomes like output growth 
and inflation.” (Rose 2011:1). 
 
 
According to the “incompatible trinity” alias policy trilemma (Mundell 1968), a country can 
only choose two of the three following goals: independent monetary policy, fixed exchange 
rates and free capital movements (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The policy trilemma 
 
 
The policy trilemma is based on the familiar uncovered interest rate parity relationship, and 
“the constraints implied by the trilemma are largely borne out by history” (Obstfeld, 
Monetary
policy 
independence
Fixed exchange
rate
Capital 
mobility
Monetary
policy 
independence
Fixed exchange
rate
Capital 
mobility
Fixed exchange
rate
Norway, Sweden and Finland
up to the 1970s
Sweden from 1993
Norway from 2001
Finland 1993-1996
Sweden in the 1980s
Norway in the 1980s and 1990s
Finland from 1996
Denmark all the time
Capital 
mobility
Monetary
policy 
independence
6 
 
Shambaugh and Taylor 2004). Given unregulated cross-border capital movements, a small 
open country that operates an inflation targeting regime must accept a floating exchange 
rate. A country that chooses a fixed exchange rate targeting regime must accept to abandon 
its monetary policy autonomy.  
However, the incompatible trinity hypothesis, as well as the policy implications of the 
corresponding Mundell-Fleming-model for a small open economy (Mundell 1968; Marrewijk 
2012), focuses on the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy with the exchange rate system. 
A look at the Nordic countries indicates that also the wage bargaining regime, the degree of 
independence of the central bank and the coordination of economic policies have a 
significant effect on the economic outcome (Holden 2005; Straumann 2010; Iversen, 
Pontusson and Soskice 2000; Iversen 2000).  
4. Monetary policy regimes and economic outcome 
 
The question why countries choose different monetary policy regimes and the question 
whether alternative regimes perform differently regarding macroeconomic variables, has 
been examined in a number of studies (Ball 2011; Benati & Goodhart 2011; Klein & 
Shambaugh 2010; Rose 2011; Christensen & Lynggård 2007; Alesina & Stella 2011; Hagelund 
2003). The results are weak and ambiguous. In a recent study, Rose (2011) argues that 
neither theoretical nor empirical studies provide clear and plausible arguments for which 
exchange rate regime is the best and deliver best results.8 Ball in his study on the 
performance of alternative monetary regimes summarises that “there is little evidence that 
inflation targeting affects performance in advanced economies.” (Ball 2011:1304) Concerning 
the European monetary union, Ball even claims that “divergence in national price levels may 
destabilize output in the future” (ibid.).This is indeed a main factor explaining the on-going 
Euro-crisis. Even Benati & Goodhart (2011) are not sure that the period of “the great 
moderation” 1993-2006, with decreasing volatilities in interest rates, inflation and output 
gaps, is mainly a result of a change in the monetary policy regime: “the impact of changes in 
the monetary policy rule is, overall, comparatively modest, whereas most of the series’ 
volatility decreases is due to decreases in the volatilities of structural innovations.” (Benati & 
Goodhart 2011:1201). A cross-country study from Danmarks Nationalbank for the period 
1970-2005 concludes that “the level of inflation fell significantly in the years after a change of 
regime, regardless of whether the country changed to a consistent fixed-exchange rate policy 
                                                          
8 “Choosing an exchange rate regime is choosing a monetary policy. As such, the exchange rate regime 
should have little effect on real long‐term growth, and it does not appear to. As a monetary choice it 
might however have implications for inflation” But “there is no consensus on any inflationary 
consequences of exchange rate regimes for typical economies” “In summary, there is scant evidence 
that the exchange rate regime matters much for anything real.” (Rose 2011:20f.) 
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or to inflation targeting. However, the estimated effect is greatest and most significant on the 
change to a fixed-exchange-rate policy. We also find that the volatility in both inflation and 
the output gap became significantly lower after the change to a consistent fixed-exchange-
rate policy, but was not reduced by the change to inflation targeting” (Christensen & Hansen 
2007). However, the study does not cover the following years of the global and European 
financial crisis.  
In the following we will discuss the Nordic countries’ choices in more detail. Finally, we will 
take a comparative look at some selected macroeconomic variables. 
5. Monetary policy regimes in the Nordic countries 
 
The Nordic countries, like other small open economies, have experimented with different 
monetary policy regimes for a long time. After the end of the Bretton Woods System, Norway 
has tried out six different variants of pegging its own currency to baskets of other countries’ 
currencies (figure 2), with a subordinated Central Bank that had to support the exchange rate 
stability by conducting the monetary policy.During the 1970s and 1980s, almost all small 
European countries, including the Nordics, pegged the home currency to the so-called Snake 
or a currency basket (Straumann 2010, ch. 5).  
In 1979, the European Union member states created the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) as a further step towards an Economic and Monetary Union. By the ERM 
as a semi-pegged system, national currency rates were fixed to the European Currency Unit 
(ECU), where fluctuations were allowed only within a narrow margin.  Of the Nordics, only 
Denmark was already a member of the EU at that time. Then Sweden and Finland joined the 
European Union together with Austria in 1995. The Eurozone with the EURO as the single, 
common currency was launched on 1 January 1999 by at first eleven member states. Of the 
three Nordic EU-members only Finland entered the Eurozone from the first day, replacing its 
own currency Finnish Markka by the Euro.  
Denmark rejected the Eurozone membership, but entered the so-called ERM II in order to 
remain in a state of “stand by” for an adoption of the EURO at a later time. ERM II replaced 
the original ERM arrangement when the EURO was established. Old EU countries that have 
not adopted the euro as well as new members have to participate for at least two years in the 
ERM II by pegging their currency to the EURO within a floating range of 15% before joining 
the Eurozone.  Since 1999, Denmark has deliberately linked its home currency Danish Crown 
within ± 2.25% against the central rate of EUR 1 = DKK 7.460 38.  
In terms of Mundell’s incompatible trinity, this means that Denmark prefers a fixed exchange 
rate against the EURO rather then to retain autonomy in national monetary policy. Formally, 
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the Danish Central Bank is independent from the ECB in Frankfurt, but actually, the Danish 
interest rates have to follow the development in the Eurozone.  
In 1992, Sweden and Finland were pressed to suspend their fixed exchange rates (Kleivset 
2012; Gerlach 1997). These two countries had to find an operational target for the new 
monetary policy. Even Norway abolished the exchange rate pegged to the ECU in 1992, but 
went back to some kind of a fixed exchange rate system in 1994. Nine years later than Sweden 
and Finland, Norway finally introduced floating exchange rates combined with inflation 
targeting. 9 Only Denmark decided to stay in the ERM.   
Both Sweden and Denmark, though members of the EU, rejected a membership of the EMU 
by referendum. Contrary to Denmark, Sweden also decided to stay outside the ERM II in 
order to maintain autonomy in choosing its own exchange rate and monetary policy regime. 
Norway continued to stay outside the EU after a negative referendum in 1994. Therefore a 
Norwegian membership in the European Monetary union was neither possible nor desired. 
Like Sweden, Norway could continue choosing its own exchange rate and monetary policy 
regime. 
Today, the four Nordic countries conduct different monetary policy and exchange rate 
systems which will be further discussed below.  
5.1. Norway 
 
Among the Nordics, changes in monetary policy regimes after World War II may have been 
most striking in Norway. Therefore, we will discuss the Norwegian case in some more detail 
than the other three countries. 
After World War II, the Bretton Woods agreement was followed by a short period of a 
floating exchange rate, again followed by a longer period of different variants of pegged 
exchange rate against baskets of other currencies until 2001 (Olsen 2011). Figure 2 shows the 
monetary policy regimes in Norway since 1816.10 
Until 1935, economic policy in Norway as in other countries was based on economic 
liberalism, conducted by right wing governments. Monetary stability was the primary target. 
The post-war depression was reinforced by a contractionary monetary and interest rate 
policy by an independent central bank, going back to the gold parity policy and defended by 
Oslo University economists.11 But this deflationary, so-called "parity policy" led to high 
unemployment, corporate bankruptcies and bank crashes. 
                                                          
9 This may also be due to the fact that the central banks in Sweden and Finland had a greater degree of 
independence in their conduct of monetary policy than the central bank in Norway. (Kleivset 2012). 
10 There were four short periods with floating exchange rate regimes. A fifth period started in 2001. 
11 According to the quantity theory, decreased money supply would reduce prices and thus 
strengthening the purchasing power of the domestic currency. According to purchasing power parity 
theory, the external value of home currency then would increase relative to gold and other currencies. 
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The crisis in the 1930s and a new view of economic policy in the wake of the Keynesian 
revolution led to a radical change in the economic policy paradigm. The Labour Party formed 
a government in 1935, with the slogan “Employment for everybody”. Full employment 
became the superior objective, prior to price stability. After World War II, “... there were few 
objections when after liberation in 1945, the government with support of the Parliament 
made decisions that under the law were the responsibilities of the central bank.” (Gjedrem 
2008:3). The Labour Party government decided the key discount rate. Norges Bank acted as 
adviser, and had to implement the government’s decisions.  
Three periods of different monetary policy regimes followed after 1945: 
(i) Low interest doctrine and credit market regulation (1945-1986) 
(ii) Fixed exchange rate as nominal anchor of monetary policy (1986-2001) 
(iii) Inflation targeting and floating exchange rate (2001-) 
In the first period after 1945 the “Norwegian Model”, a variant of the Nordic model, was 
formed. The overall goals of full employment and low and stable interest rates became the 
two leading norms or “doctrines” in Norwegian economic policy (Skånland 2004).  
Thus, the monetary policy regime was indeed a core element of the Norwegian model.  The 
policy was implemented by a central bank which was not an independent institution but 
under the political control of the government. “In the first decades after the Second World 
War, it was firmly believed that the economy could be fine-tuned in the desired direction by 
coordinating instruments established by the central authorities.” (Gjedrem 2008:3). 
The combination of credit market regulation, interest rate regulation and fixed exchange rate 
in a small, open market economy was – according to Mundell’s ‘incompatible trinity’  only 
possible because the government also regulated cross-border capital movements.  
Figure 2: Monetary Policy Regimes in Norway 
1816 - 2012
* Floating exchange rate
* Transition to the Silver standard
* Silver standard
* Gold standard
* Floating exchange rate
* Fixed exchange rate against £ & $
* Bretton Woods system
* Floating exchange rate
* Smithonian Treaty
* «The snake in the tunnel»
* European snake cooperation
* Trade weighted currency basket
* Pegged to the ECU
* Floating exchange rate
* Stability against European Currencies
(managed floating regime)
* Inflation target and floating exchange rate
Source: Adapted from Norges Bank (2004)
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Since the 1960s, the “Scandinavian model of inflation”, in Norway also called the “Aukrust 
model” (Aukrust 1977), has served as a basis for analysis of the factors determining price and 
wage developments. In a normative perspective the Aukrust model can be viewed as a tool for 
determining wage increases compatible with maintaining international competitiveness in 
the internationally exposed sectors. Then, depending on the exchange rate regime, either the 
domestic inflation rate or the exchange rate is determined endogenously. 
Until 2001, both the government and the main parties in the labour market preferred a stable 
exchange rate. The Central Bank of Norway had to control the home interest rate in order to 
stabilize the exchange rate in the short and medium term according to the international 
interest rate parity and exchange rate expectations. 
Similar to Sweden, Norway deliberately pursued an expansive anti-cyclical budget policy in 
the international recessions in the seventies and eighties. High wage increases contributed to 
a deterioration of the international competitiveness of the tradable goods sector. There was 
no independent monetary policy authority which could curb domestic cost inflation. The 
effect was “internal revaluation” of the Norwegian krone and deterioration of the 
competitiveness of the export sector. A gradual deregulation of credit markets and 
abandonment of capital controls, but not of the interest rate regulation, and frequent 
devaluations revealed a policy model that was under great pressure. The ‘incompatible 
trinity’ became obvious: The political economy could not achieve three goals simultaneously - 
domestic monetary sovereignty, capital mobility, and exchange rate stability. “The 
importance of providing the economy with a nominal anchor became evident.” (Gjedrem 
2008:4).  
The second period started when a new monetary policy regime was launched in 1986. The 
low interest doctrine was abolished. The exchange rate was to be the “nominal anchor”, 
linking domestic inflation to inflation abroad and thereby importing price stability. The 
parties in the labour market had to accept the new policy strategy as a framework for future 
wage negotiations. In particular this meant accepting the exogenously determined rate of 
inflation together with a policy rule based on the theory of the “Scandinavian model of 
inflation”.12  
The new monetary policy of a stable exchange rate was also a core element in the so-called 
"Solidarity Agreement" implemented in the early nineties. This agreement can be seen as a 
revitalization of the “corporatist compromise” as it is based on the cooperation of four core 
institutions in the Norwegian political economy: the government, the Confederation of 
Norwegian Business and Industry, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions and Norges 
                                                          
12 In 1985, a new legislation ‘The Norges Bank Act’was adopted which gave Norges Bank greater 
independence.  (http://www.norges-bank.no/en/about/mandate-and-core-
responsibilities/legislation/norges-bank-act/ (accessed 10 March 2012). 
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Bank. The Solidarity Agreement confirmed that monetary policy should be carried out by the 
central bank in order to guarantee and defend a stable exchange rate (Schewe 1999).  
During the nineties, it became apparent that a fixed (or managed floating) exchange rate 
regime with the exchange rate as the nominal anchor was not optimal. Both the budget policy 
and the monetary policy were challenged by a special policy dilemma: Expansionary budgets 
leading to price and wage increases could not be counteracted by a contractionary monetary 
policy aimed at defending a stable exchange rate. Increasing oil prices and export surpluses, 
leading to appreciation pressure on the Norwegian krone, had to be accommodated by lower 
interest rates and vice versa. In this way, the monetary policy caused pro-cyclical instead of 
anti-cyclical effects. Moreover, oil price changes will cause an ‘asymmetric shock’ in an oil 
exporting economy like Norway compared to an oil importing economy like the European 
Union.  
Therefore, both leading economists in Norway and Norges Bank advised the government to 
change the monetary policy target to stabilising the rate of domestic inflation instead of 
stabilising the exchange rate.13 
On 29 March 2001, the government proposed “New guidelines for Norwegian economic 
policy” in two parts: 
(1) The new ‘fiscal policy guideline’ contains a rule to limit the state budget deficit. The rule 
states that the use of petroleum revenues financing the structural non-oil budget deficit, 
should over time be in line with the expected real return on the Government Pension 
Fund Global (GPFG), estimated at four per cent yearly over the whole business cycle. In 
the long run, the fiscal guideline places an upper limit on the use of the country’s huge 
petroleum revenues, thereby preventing excessive rent-seeking activities. 
(2) With the new ‘Regulation on Monetary policy’, a new assignment in monetary policy 
came into force: instead of a stable exchange rate target, an inflation target was 
introduced. 
Norway adapted flexible inflation targeting as a rule-based monetary policy framework and 
even introduced a fiscal policy rule (Olsen 2011; Kleivseth 2012). The operational target is an 
annual consumer price inflation close to 2.5 per cent over time, but monetary policy shall also 
contribute to stabilising output and employment. The flexible inflation target of 2.5 per cent 
represents an anchor to stabilize the expectations of inflation. 
                                                          
13 “It has been demonstrated that the fixed exchange rate policy that involves linking to a group of 
countries with a different economic situation than our own, results in adverse fluctuations in interest 
rates and the real economy. Monetary policy had to get new guidelines.” (Skånland 2004:124). 
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Norway’s central bank uses the so-called ‘key policy interest rate’, which is the interest rate 
on bank deposits in Norges Bank, as its most important monetary policy instrument.14  
One may ask whether these new policy guidelines imply a radical move away from the 
Norwegian (Nordic) model. 
The government underlines; “While the new guidelines represent a different mandate for 
Norges Bank, they do not themselves imply a significant change in the conduct of monetary 
policy. The new guidelines for fiscal policy and monetary policy provide a good basis for 
maintaining a stable exchange rate … There are no changes to the constitutional framework 
for monetary policy. The Government remains responsible for overall economic policy, and 
sets guidelines for Norges Bank’s conduct of monetary policy” (New guidelines for Norwegian 
economic policy 2001). 
According to Skånland, the former president of Norges Bank, there was a “long way to go” 
before an inflation target was officially in place in 2001.15 
Today, Norway with huge oil and gas resources has become a “dual economy”: While the 
“offshore-sector” is generating a lasting boom, high income flows and export surpluses, 
almost unaffected by international financial crises, the export- and import competing 
industries in the traditional “mainland-sector” are struggling.  
 
Therefore, monetary policy in Norway is in a dilemma between dampening domestic demand 
by rising interest rates on the one hand, and on the other hand stabilizing the krone’s 
                                                          
14 When Norges Bank started to publish interest rate forecasts, the interest rate was first modelled by a 
generalised Taylor rule (Taylor 1993). Later, Norges Bank used an optimal policy approach minimising 
a loss function. Simple rules are still used as cross-checks (Holmsen et al. 2008; Olsen 2011). 
15 “it is inconceivable that such a guideline for monetary policy could  have been adopted in 1980 or 
1986 and not as an alternative to  the floating regime which was implemented in 1992. Besides that 
price stability as an end in itself yet was considered to be in conflict with the interests of employment, 
the inflation targeting was not tested in our part of the world. It may therefore be questionable 
whether it ever would had the necessary confidence-building effect.” (Skånland 2004:112). 
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exchange rate in order to preserve competitiveness in the internationally exposed mainland 
sectors (Olsen 2013). The exchange rate has always been regarded as an important factor for 
the overall competitiveness of Norwegian industries. In the Scandinavian model of inflation, 
the exchange rate is a core variable. Stabilizing the exchange rate requires a low interest rate 
at home in line with low interest rates abroad, according to the uncovered interest rate parity 
theory. At the same time, low interest rates push up domestic demand at home.  
Today, Norwegian monetary policy – even formally aimed at a stable inflation rate of 2.5 %. – 
is actually oriented towards stabilizing the exchange rate of the krone. With perfect capital 
mobility in a small open economy, the Norwegian interest rate has to follow the interest rates 
abroad according to the interest rate parity, in particular according to the EURO-rate.16  
Like in earlier periods, monetary policy in Norway has to support the high employment 
policy by the government. In accordance with the theory of a small economy with flexible 
exchange rates (Mundell-Fleming-model), this is a challenge to Norway. Therefore, even 
today domestic demand, wage and price effects have to be handled by fiscal policy and 
income policy. 
The monetary policy dilemma in the dual economy of Norway today, with a new monetary 
policy rule for inflation targeting, is the same as earlier in the fixed exchange rate regime: 
Norges Bank have to balance between the interests of the offshore and the mainland sector: 
the choice between stabilizing the exchange rate and inflation targeting.  
So far, the leading labour market organisations are aware of this dilemma and work for 
moderate wage increases, even in the current, long lasting economic boom. Wage pressure is 
further dampened by intended labour immigration. Consumer price inflation is dampened by 
falling prices for Asian import goods. It is a remarkable fact that there is no inflation pressure 
today compared to the period in the late nineties and earlier periods. 
So far, the new budgetary policy and the new monetary policy guidelines have contributed to 
facilitate a balanced development of the Norwegian economy by easing the pressure on 
interest rates, the krone exchange rate and industries exposed to international competition. 
But in the Norwegian macroeconomic policy model there is still a need for a third policy rule: 
A corporatist income policy of centralized wage negotiations has to be continued aimed at 
ensuring moderate wage increases and international competitiveness of the mainland 
industries. Working together, this three-dimensional policy mix of coordinated budgetary, 
monetary and wage policies is still the real core of the Norwegian political economy today.    
                                                          
16 The Norwegian krone is a natural resource based currency, and the exchange rate is highly 
correlated with the oil price (see figure 3). All government revenues from the oil and gas sector are 
transferred in the The Government Pension Fund Global, administered by the Central Bank, who 
invests the revenues in foreign assets  abroad.  In that way, a continuous huge export surplus is 
compensated by a corresponding capital export. It is important to note that the real exchange rate in 
Norway did not appreciate significantly compared to other resource-rich countries (Olsen 2013). 
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5.2. Denmark 
 
After World War II, Denmark like the other Nordics, adhered to a fixed exchange regime. 
After the end of the Bretton Woods agreement, Denmark joined the European “Snake”-
agreement in 1972, from 1979 the ERM and the European Currency Unit ECU.17 After some 
discrete devaluations of the DKK in 1979-1981, the government announced in 1982 that it 
would not make further exchange rate adjustments. Unlike Sweden in 1993 and Norway in 
2001, Denmark did not switch from the fixed exchange rate target to a national inflation 
targeting and floating exchange rate regime. This seemed reasonable in light of the option to 
join the EMU later. 
When the Euro was introduced, the Danish krone joined the ERM II on 1 January 1999, and 
observes a central rate of 7.46038 to the euro with a narrow fluctuation band of ±2.25%. On 
that way, Denmark is satisfying one of the convergence criteria for entering to the euro area 
at any time.18 
The Danish policy regime today is still a good example to proof Mundell’s policy trilemma:  
“Sustainable fiscal policy and a clear distribution of responsibilities in relation to economic 
policy make it easier for a central bank to meet its objectives. In Denmark, this distribution of 
responsibilities has been specified clearly: monetary and exchange-rate policies are aimed at 
keeping the krone stable vis-à-vis the euro, while any specific need to stabilize cyclical 
fluctuations in Denmark is handled via fiscal policy or other economic policies. Successful 
monetary policy, whereby inflation expectations are kept at a low and stable level, requires a 
credible central bank that is independent of the political system in its implementation of 
monetary policy.” (Danmarks Nationalbank 2009:3) 
The main objective is to obtain low inflation at home, and the fixed exchange rate of the 
krone against the euro is the intermediate target for monetary policy. It is in fact the inflation 
target of the ECB that serves as an anchor for Denmark’s monetary policy. In that way, 
Denmark imports price stability from a big and stable currency area. Danmarks 
Nationalbank’s key interest rates have to mirror the key interest rates fixed by the ECB for 
the whole Euro area. Short term fluctuations in the exchange rate are compensated by 
purchasing and selling foreign exchange by the central bank. If the krone tends to strengthen 
or weaken, the central bank will adjust the interest rates in order to increase or reduce the 
interest rate differential against the Euro rate. In 2012-13 for example, the Danish key rates 
were fixed below the ECB rates. For the first time in its history, the Danish central bank has 
                                                          
17 Denmark joined the European Union as the first Nordic country as early as in 1973. A hard peg of the 
Danish krone to the ECU was therefore plausible. 
18 A country must participate in the mechanism without severe tensions for at least two years before it 
can qualify to adopt the euro. 
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set one of its key interest rates negative in order to defend a stable exchange rate (Jørgensen 
and Risbjerg 2012). 
5.3. Finland 
 
The economic development after World War II was characterized by a predominant 
economic integration with the West together with a special relationship and bilateral trade 
agreements with the Soviet Union. Finland joined the Bretton Woods agreement in 1952, and 
the Finnish markka became convertible in 1958. But, extensive financial regulation of interest 
rates, the money market, and capital flows maintained until the 1980s. A deregulation of the 
financial markets started in the 1980s which culminated in a financial crisis in 1991 and 
economic recession, not unlike the development of the Nordic neighbours. Similar to 
Sweden, the Finnish currency was allowed to float from 1992, and the monetary regime 
changed to inflation targeting from 1993 to 1996.19 Inflation targeting  became accepted, and 
the policy produced the desired results in terms of stabilizing inflation at a low level and even 
stabilizing the exchange rate of the “Finnish markka” (Pikkarainen et al. 1997). After Finland 
had joined the EU in 1995, the currency was pegged to the ECU by joining the ERM in 1996. 
When the European Monetary Union started in 1999, Finland participated from the first day. 
As a part in the Euro area, Finland is no longer conducting an independent monetary policy. 
The key interest rates of the ECB are set by the Governing Council of the ECB which includes 
the Governor of the Bank of Finland as a member (Bank of Finland 2013; European Central 
Bank 2011). Weighting the pros and cons of the Finnish membership in the currency union20, 
the governor of the Bank of Finland as late as in 2009 concluded that “... all in all, 
membership in the euro area has served Finland very well so far.”, with the euro as stabilising 
factor, “... an anchor that has helped to make the whole economy more long-term oriented 
and less prone to cyclical fluctuations.” (Liikanen 2009). It should be mentioned that this 
was written before the Euro crisis accelerated.21 
Wage setting is anchored by low and stable inflation expectations and maintaining 
competitiveness in a longer perspective, similar to the Nordic neighbours Sweden and 
Norway who are “floating” but also “inflation targeting”.  
  
                                                          
19 The target was specified as to stabilize underlying inflation at about 2 %. 
20 For a short review of the EMU and the concept of an optimum currency area see Marrewiijk 2012. 
21  Together with Germany, Austria, The Netherlands, Finland represents the “Northern” and sound 
members in the EMU today. “Northern gripes. Finland and the euro crisis” The Economist 25 August 
2012 (http://www.economist.com/node/21560865; accessed 25 May 2013). 
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5.4. Sweden 
 
After World War II, Sweden had a fixed exchange rate. As in Norway, the fixed exchange rate 
regime was seriously challenged by fundamental economic imbalances during the 1980s and 
1990s. Sweden devalued the krone five times, and as much as 16 % in 1982. 
Sweden switched from fixed exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting with floating 
exchange rates as early as in 1993. In a referendum in 2003, the Swedes rejected to become a 
member of the EMU and to adopt the euro as its own currency. To return to fixed exchange 
rate targeting, by membership in the ERM II, was no longer relevant.  
Interestingly, the statutory mandate in “Sveriges Riksbank Act” focus only on inflation: “The 
objective of the Riksbank's activities shall be to maintain price stability” without specifying a 
numerical target.  
The Riksbank has specified a numerical inflation target as “the annual change in the 
consumer price index (CPI) is to be 2 per cent”. Moreover, also “flexible” inflation targeting is 
confirmed in order to combine inflation targeting with “real economic stability”:  
“At the same time as monetary policy is aimed at attaining the inflation target, it is also to 
support the objectives of general economic policy for the purpose of attaining sustainable 
growth and a high level of employment” (Sveriges Riksbank 2010:5). The Riksbank does this 
by not merely striving to stabilise inflation around the inflation target, but also striving to 
stabilise the real economy, that is, production and employment. “The Riksbank thus conducts 
what is known as flexible inflation targeting” (Ibid.:12). Flexible here means that the 
Riksbank does not focus solely on inflation. 
6. Macroeconomic development and different 
monetary policy regimes in the Nordic countries 
 
As mentioned earlier, studies on the performance of monetary policy regimes provide no 
clear results. Due to the fact that the Nordic countries after 1992 chose different monetary 
and exchange rate policy regimes, it still makes sense to have a comparative look at selected 
macroeconomic variables during the last two decades.  
All four countries considered are highly integrated with the European Union as measured by 
trade flows (figure 4). The share of exports to EU is lowest in Sweden and Finland. Both 
countries are even less dependent on the EU countries than Germany. It is in fact the non-EU 
member Norway that is most dependent on the EU as export market, even with slightly 
increasing shares during the last ten years. 
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One could argue here that it would be more appropriate for Norway to fix its own currency to 
the EURO, in the same way as Denmark does, in order to lower transaction costs for the 
exporting (and importing) companies. On the other hand, the dual Norwegian economy is 
exposed to asymmetric shocks vis-à-vis the Euro countries which argues for a flexible 
exchange rate.  
 
When we compare real economic growth in the Nordics with growth in the EU, the Euro area, 
and to other Euro-countries (Germany and Austria), we can not find any reliable effect of the 
exchange rate system on growth (table 1). The small open Euro country Austria appears as 
strong as the resource based economy of Norway, with inflation targeting and a floating 
exchange rate. Moreover, a look at the yearly growth rates indicates no remarkable 
differences in growth volatility (Figure 8 in appendix). 
Figure 5 shows the yearly average unemployment rates 1995-2012 in the Nordic countries as 
well as in the EU, the Euro area and in Germany and Austria. 
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Figure 4: Share of exports to EU in total exports (%) 
Nordic Countries and Germany 1999-2012
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Norway
Germany
EU 27
Source: Eurostat. 
1990-1998 1999-2007 2008-2013 1990-2013 4)
European Union 1) --- 2,5 -0,1 1,7
Euro area 2) --- 2,3 -0,3 1,4
Denmark 2,4 1,9 -0,6 1,5
Finland 1,4 3,6 -0,3 1,8
Sweden 1,4 3,4 1,1 2,1
Norway 3,8 2,4 1,0 2,6
Germany 3) 1,4 1,7 0,7 1,3
Austria 2,7 2,6 0,7 2,1
4) for EU and Euro area 1996-2013. For Germany from 1992.
Remarks
Table 1: Gross domestic produkt - annual growth rates real (%) 
1990-2013
1) European Union (EU6-1972, EU9-1980, EU10-1985, EU12-1994, EU15-2004, EU25-2006, EU27)
2) Euro area (EA11-2000, EA12-2006, EA13-2007, EA15-2008, EA16-2010, EA17)
3) Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG)
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The picture looks a bit confusing. In average, the unemployment in both the non EU-
member, floating country Norway and the Euro member Austria has been lowest and most 
stable. The other three Nordics show decreasing unemployment rates during the whole 
period prior to the financial crisis, followed by the Euro crisis. Even Sweden with floating 
exchange rate and flexible inflation targeting, is significantly hit by the crisis. Most 
remarkably, Germany is experiencing sharply falling unemployment which is now lower than 
in three of the four Nordic countries. This seems, among other, to be result of an internal 
devaluation over several years. 
 
In the period of the “great moderation” after 1993, inflation rates in almost all European 
countries declined markedly, and even the inflation volatility decreased. Inflation in the 
Nordic countries in the period 1995-2012 was close, but somewhat below the price 
development in the whole Euro area (see table 2 above and figures 9 & 10 in the appendix). 
We cannot identify any significant effect on inflation from the choice of a particular monetary 
policy and exchange rate regime. The “floating” countries Norway and Sweden did as well as 
the fixed exchange rate targeting countries Denmark and Finland, and even similar to the 
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Figure 5: Unemployment rates yearly 1995-2012 -
in the Nordics, EU, €-area, Germany and Austria
EU
€-area
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Norway
Austria
Germany
Source: Eurostat.
1997-2012 1997-2007 2008-2012
EU 27 3,0 % 3,2 % 2,5 %
Euro area 2,0 % 2,0 % 2,1 %
Denmark 2,0 % 1,9 % 2,4 %
Finland 1,9 % 1,5 % 2,7 %
Sweden 1,6 % 1,5 % 1,9 %
Norway 1,9 % 1,9 % 1,9 %
Germany 1,6 % 1,5 % 1,7 %
Austria 1,8 % 1,6 % 2,3 %
Source: Eurostat
Table 2: Harmonized indices of consumer 
prices (HICP). Average growth in per cent 
1997-2012
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traditionally low inflation countries Germany and Austria. Anyway, both inflation targeting 
with roughly the same target rate of 2-2.5 per cent and pegged exchange rate or membership 
in the EMU give the same effects on inflation.  
I have also calculated the “empirical” Philips-curves for the different countries that are 
included in the analysis of this paper. Figure 11 in the appendix indicates roughly that there 
are almost no significant loops which indicate a systematic interaction between 
unemployment and inflation. Especially in Norway and in Austria, the Philips-curves are 
nearly vertical. 
What about the development of different monetary indicators? Let us first take a look at the 
development of the exchange rates.  
 
Figure 6 shows the development of the national currencies’ exchange rate 1980 – 2013. After 
the turbulent period with high inflation rates in the 1980s, and after the following – final - 
choice of the exchange rate regime, the exchange rates in all four countries stabilized – in 
accordance with inflation rates converging at a lower level. Anyway, we can observe that 
Norway and Sweden show more variable exchange rates against the Euro, according to their 
floating exchange rate regime. Denmark managed to keep the krone quite stable to the Euro. 
What can we say about the development of the international competitiveness? In the 1970s 
and 1980s, the Nordic countries were exposed to wage-price spirals generating a detoriation 
of the international competitiveness of the export sectors. They were forced to devaluate the 
home currency several times. After the EMS crisis in 1992-93 and the subsequent changes of 
the monetary policy and exchange rate regimes during the 1990s, the international 
competitiveness stabilized. We use the real effective exchange rate as an appropriate measure 
of changes in international competitiveness over time. In figure 7, we have calculated real 
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effective exchange rates that show the pure effect of differences in the real unit labour costs 
plus changes in the nominal exchange rate between the countries.22 
 
We can see that the Nordic countries (except from Norway) have done pretty well, but 
slightly worse than Germany, Austria and the Euro area in total. This correlates with the 
development of unemployment too. Norway’s performance is less impressive. Real unit 
labour costs have increased steeply in recent years, mainly due to the wage drift effect of the 
huge and highly profitable oil and gas sector. Whether they have chosen a national (home) 
inflation target rate or the supranational inflation target rate of the ECB as the nominal 
anchor of monetary policy, all Nordic countries have to take into account the real effective 
exchange rate. 
7. Conclusion 
 
In some way, all four Nordic countries have been conducting a monetary policy regime of 
flexible inflation targeting since the 1990s (Norway as late as from 2001). Essential 
similarities and differences between the countries may be as follows: 
- Norway and Sweden are – both political and in reality - quite independent and 
autonomous. Central banks are therefore able to adapt domestic key interest rates to the 
economic situation at home. In that way, these two countries have solved the 
incompatible trinity by choosing a combination of monetary policy autonomy and flexible 
exchange rates. But they have to take into account the strong effect of the interest rate 
parity on the domestic exchange rate. 
                                                          
22 See also the development of the real effective exchange rates in figure 12 & 13, with the consumer 
price index as deflator versus the unit labor cost index as deflator.  
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Figure 7: Real effective exchange rates Nordic Countries, Germany, Austria and the Euro area 
1994-2011 (real ULC deflated = ULC deflated minus CPI deflated)
Euro area
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Norway
Germany
Austria
Source: Eurostat. Norges Bank. 
1) Geometric averages against EU 27-trading partners. From 1999 EURO in Finland.
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- Finland has solved the incompatible trinity by joining the world’s biggest monetary 
union, abolishing the home currency Finnish markka. The influence on the ECB’s 
monetary policy is only indirect and limited. The key interest rate of the ECB has to 
accommodate the economic situation in the whole currency union of 17 countries. 
Stabilization policy “at home” in Finland has to be conducted mainly by fiscal and wage 
policies. In this way, Finnish stabilization policy can affect the country’s real exchange 
rate by “internal” devaluation or revaluation. 
- Denmark did not join the EMU for political reasons. But anyhow, Denmark pegged the 
home currency Danish krone to the Euro as a member of the ERMII-mechanism. The 
Danish National Bank, politically independent, has to follow the inflation targeting policy 
of the ECB and cannot use an independent interest policy. Therefore, in Denmark as in 
Finland, stabilization policy has to be conducted mainly by fiscal and coordinated wage 
policies that would affect the real exchange rate and international competitiveness. 
Monetary policy can be characterized by “imported” inflation targeting. 
In a way, all four Nordics have limited power to conduct an independent monetary policy. In 
order to keep the own country’s international competitiveness, they have to get help from the 
parties in the labour marked to adapt wage setting compatible to the external inflation target. 
A crucial factor for influencing unemployment are the relative unit labour costs measured 
with the real effective exchange rates (see figure 7). 
In this context, the Nordic model may have succeeded pretty well also in newer time despite 
the different monetary policy regimes. A combination of coordinated wage setting, low wage 
differences and moderate wage increases in order to keep the real effective exchange rates 
and thereby the competitiveness stable is still a constituent element of the Nordic model. 
This is probably most clearly recognized in the case of Norway. As a policy rule, “flexible” 
inflation targeting in Norway and Sweden allows the central banks to “accommodate” cyclical 
shocks in the real economy. 
The data demonstrate that the Nordic countries – compared to the Eurozone in average and 
the southern countries in particular – have maintained a stable development of the home 
currency, even a slight real depreciation. Only Norway has to deal with a significant internal 
appreciation of its home currency that the central bank is not able to handle by interest 
policy. The goal of industrial, fiscal and wage policies is to preserve international 
competitiveness in the long run. The monetary policy may ensure either a stable exchange 
rate (as in Denmark) or a stable inflation rate as a nominal anchor (by inflation targeting in 
Sweden and Norway – and indirectly in the Eurozone-member Finland). 
Viewed in a political-economic perspective, I prefer the Swedish and Norwegian regime of 
flexible inflation targeting by an autonomous central bank with a floating exchange rate. A 
membership in the Eurozone in case of Finland as like as the ERMII membership in the case 
22 
 
of Denmark requires homogenous political preferences and abandonment of a national 
monetary policy.23In both regimes, the focus on the control of the real effective exchange rate 
is crucial for stabilization policy. But at least, retaining national monetary policy control gives 
a small open economy an additional degree of freedom to respond flexibly to external or 
internal shocks.This said, it is tempting to conclude that the choice of a particular monetary 
policy regime is not a constituent element of the Nordic model. 
At present time, and given the Euro crisis, we can not observe that the current – and different 
- monetary policy regimes are discussed and put into question in the Nordic countries. This 
may be explained by the fact that the different regimes in reality have worked rather well in 
the near past. In the flexible inflation targeting countries Norway and Sweden, the fixed 
exchange rate targeting country Denmark as well as the Euro zone member Finland, inflation 
targeting seems to be accepted as the nominal anchor of the monetary policy. 
 
 
  
                                                          
23 The Danish ERMII-membership has, due to the policy trilemma, implies a loss of real monetary 
policy autonomy as like as in the Finnish case. 
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Figure  8: Gross Domestic Product in four Nordic Countries and the Euro area 1990-2013
(Annual volume growth in per cent
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Denmark
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Source: Eurostat. Norges Bank. 
1) From 1999 EURO in Finland.
0,0 %
0,5 %
1,0 %
1,5 %
2,0 %
2,5 %
3,0 %
3,5 %
4,0 %
4,5 %
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 9: Harmonized Consumer Price Indices in the Nordic Countries, Germany, Austria 
and the Euro area 1997-2012 (annual growth in per cent)
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Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure 10: Harmonized Consumer Price Indicesin the Nordic Countries, Germany, Austria 
and the Euro area 1996-2012 (1996 = 100)
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Figure 12: Real effective exchange rates Nordic Countries, Germany, Austria and the Euro area
1994-2011 (CPI deflated)
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Source: Eurostat. Norges Bank. 
1) Geometric averages against EU 27-trading partners. From 1999 EURO in Finland.
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Figure 13: Real effective exchange rates Nordic Countries, Germany, Austria and the Euro area
1994-2011 (ULC deflated)
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Source: Eurostat. Norges Bank. 
1) Geometric averages against EU 27-trading partners. From 1999 EURO in Finland.
